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The Spatial Dimension of Insurgent-Civilian Relations: 
Routinised Insurgent Space 
Francis O’Connor1 
ABSTRACT 
This working paper is a first step in the development of a conceptual framework to analyse 
the spaces where insurgents and civilians interact. Building on relational research address-
ing insurgent support networks and rebel governance, it develops the concept of Routinised 
Insurgent Space (RIS) as a means to systematically assess the way that movements spa-
tially order interactions with existing and potential supporters. It focuses on four specific 
examples of RIS: insurgent systems of justice and policing, service provision, prison mobili-
sation and funerals. It draws primarily on two case studies, the M-19 in Colombia (early 
1970s–1990) and the PKK in Turkey (mid 1970s–1999).  
1 INTRODUCTION 
“Ok brother, this is your last chance, no more, if you want to go, you can go. 
But if you want to stay here, go back to your farm, go back to your family, 
because you cannot continue robbing here, if you do, you will be shot2” 
(M-19 militant- Personal Interview, Bogota 2018) 
Beyond waging war, insurgent movements go to huge lengths to to deliberately interact 
with civilians in their immediate social environment. These efforts can range from tutoring 
school children or even building schools, distributing basic necessities like medicine, milk 
and wellingtons, punishing criminals, orchestrating funerals and commemorative ceremo-
nies, and organising detainees in prison and supporting their families. Why do insurgent 
movements expend their time and precious resources, risking exposure to the authorities, 
to help individuals who might not even sympathise with their movement? The simple an-
swer is: to garner legitimacy and through legitimacy, popular support. This is not to argue 
that insurgent access to material resources is not a priority for but rather that, without a 
degree of legitimacy and of popular recognition, armed groups are inevitably reduced to a 
form of banditry; forced to obtain resources through violence and intimidation. Legitimacy 
is both a perishable resource and a relational phenomenon, accruing only when certain 
behaviours by insurgent movements are acknowledged by their target audience: it is thus 
jointly produced by armed movements and their supporters. While legitimacy also has 
symbolic and performative elements (Podder 2017), its co-production is rooted in the multi-
tude of social ties and reciprocal commitments between armed groups and their support-
ers.  
However, these relational dynamics are neither abstract nor de-contextualised, occurring 
rather in specific physical environments, strategically selected and prioritized by insurgent 
strategists. While many rigorous concepts allow us to analyse the relational element of the 
insurgent movements’ constituencies (Malthaner 2011), reference communities (Neidhardt 
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2010), social networks (Staniland 2014; Gould 1995) – the spatial element of this equation 
arguably remains under developed. This paper seeks to rectify this gap by developing a 
conceptual framework to theorize the “where” of insurgent interactions with supporters. 
This framework, built around the core concept of routinised insurgent space, will supple-
ment existing approaches by incorporating spatial dimensions into movement-supporters’ 
relationships and track them from incipient early mobilisation, through periods of consoli-
dation, institutionalisation and/or decline.  
This working paper is a first exploratory step towards a comprehensive conceptual evalua-
tion of how and where insurgent movements interact with their supportive constituencies. 
In asymmetrical conflicts, the boundary between armed actors and civilians is blurred; of-
tentimes clandestine activists are engaged in years of activism to which even close family 
members are oblivious. In multi-actor conflicts, it is often unclear to which group militants 
belong, and indeed both insurgents and counter-insurgents often engage in mimicry of 
rivals in order to commit atrocities or obtain resources (Mamidi 2009). These challenges 
hold true even for those who are positively inclined toward insurgent movements and can 
partially explain why sometimes insurgents and potential supporters “drift past one anoth-
er”(Staniland 2014: 29). Accordingly, insurgent movements deliberately engineer or appro-
priate existing social spaces to facilitate interactions with supportive constituencies, a 
strategy which this paper argues can be understood as the creation of routinised insurgent 
space (RIS). In cases of greater insurgent territorial control, they take on a semi-
institutionalised character, but they also prevail in contexts of partial insurgent control or 
where insurgents only enjoy social control. Indeed, they can contribute to the establishment 
of territorial control rather than being an outcome of it. These spaces become imbued with 
specific symbolism and aspire to consistency in practise. This paper details how these 
routinised insurgent spaces are initially formed, the evolving nature and function of ties 
forged within them, and their spatial variation. 
As a working paper on armed movements, it inevitably builds on the immense canon of civil 
war literature (Kalyvas 2006; Goodwin 2001; Beissinger 2002; Weinstein 2007; 
Fearon/Laitin 2003) and more recent authoritative works (Steele 2017; Balcells 2017). 
However, it will mostly draw on two distinct forms of political violence literature, the bur-
geoning analysis of rebel governance (Arjona/Kasfir/Mampilly 2015; Arjona 2014, 2016a; 
Kasfir 2005; Arjona 2017; Podder 2014) and the relational perspective that characterises 
much research on armed groups, in the broadly defined, field of social movements studies 
(della Porta 2013; Tilly 2003; Alimi/Bosi/Demetriou 2015; Della Porta 1995). These litera-
tures are prioritised because they deal most consistently with the totality of relationships 
between armed groups and their supporters, and not just on practises of insurgent violence 
against civilians. Parkinson and Zaks (2018)’s review article draws on organizational soci-
ology to stake a claim for a further distinct organisational approach, emphasising the dif-
ferentiation of roles within movements, their ties with other actors, the behaviour of organi-
zations’ members and their objectives (2018: 273). Yet, beyond the terminology – organisa-
tion as opposed to movement – it is not immediately apparent how such an approach sub-
stantially differs from existing concepts well established in the social movements ap-
proach. 
Although both social movements and rebel governance approaches address similar phe-
nomena, it can be argued that, to a substantial extent, the literatures do not fully engage 
with one another3. While of course it would be absurd to suggest that any specific approach 
should or should not draw on different theoretical approaches (or indeed any particular 
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not cite any single work by the most significant scholar in social movement studies, Donatella della Porta.  
3 
 
PRIF Working Paper No. 44 
author), this paper argues that there is much currently unrecognised complementarity be-
tween them. The social movement analysis of political violence is well suited to address 
early phases of mobilisation, escalation from non-violent to violent mobilisation, clandes-
tine violence and urban armed campaigns. While this is widely accepted, social movement 
studies has also much to offer across the trajectories of violent mobilisation, up to and 
beyond the threshold of civil wars. It can elucidate relational processes between supporters 
and opponents, mobilisation in areas of weaker insurgent presence and dynamics with 
other violent and non-violent politically sympathetic actors. On the other hand, rebel gov-
ernance is a superb approach for understanding the consolidation of already mobilised 
insurgent groups, internal dynamics of movements and their steps to implement nascent 
counter-states in territories under their control. This also includes cases of insurgent suc-
cesses where armed groups actually proceed to take control of the state. Although it would 
be exaggerated to baldly assert that these approaches lay either side of a chronological 
divide: social movements for initial phases and rebel governance for latter periods, in the 
prevailing literature this has tended to be the case. This paper argues that the combination 
of both approaches allows a more comprehensive overview of insurgent movement trajec-
tories from their very initial steps to their subsequent transformations, success or demise.  
Drawing on the literature on rebel governance and social movement studies, this project 
analyses four distinct forms of routinised insurgent spaces: (1) Insurgent systems of jus-
tice and policing; (2) insurgent service provision; (3) insurgent prison mobilisation and (4) 
insurgent funerals. Focusing on specific spaces of insurgent agency rather than more mac-
ro-level insurgent strategising also lends itself well to more focused comparative analysis. 
Rather than addressing what insurgencies in different national contexts have in common or 
not, it focuses on deliberately constructed micro-level spaces which occur across in most 
insurgencies. All insurgent groups engage in some form of policing, most provide some 
form of rudimentary services, they all suffer imprisonment which forces them to also organ-
ise in prison and, to a lesser extent, many organise symbolic important events like funerals 
or martyrs’ commemoration. This, of course, is not an exhaustive list of routinised insurgent 
spaces: some movements establish and/or control refugee camps, certain religiously in-
spired groups can draw on religiously oriented spaces such as mosques/churches and 
prayer groups, while other movements have used sports clubs or cooking circles as arenas 
of interaction. However, an extensive trawl through the civil wars literature suggests that 
the listed routinised insurgent spaces are the most recurrent, across ideological divides and 
differing socio-cultural and political contexts. 
This paper is grounded in ongoing research on two specific movements the PKK in Turkey 
and the M-19 in Colombia. It is chronologically focused on the PKK’s mobilisation from the 
mid-1970s until 1999 and the M-19 from the early 1970s until its de-mobilization in 1990. 
The cases have been selected as most similar cases, as both movements enjoyed a degree 
of territorial control but were for the most of the time active in areas where they enjoyed 
little more than social control and operated in a semi-clandestine fashion. This research is 
based on around sixty interviews conducted for the author’s doctoral research on the PKK 
conducted between 2011 and 2014 (O'Connor 2014; O’Connor and Celik 2018). Additionally, 
albeit in a less structured fashion, the author continues to conduct interviews with mem-
bers of the Kurdish diaspora, members and sympathisers of the PKK in Europe who have 
experiences of the conflict in the Kurdish region in Turkey during the period under study. 
Regrettably, the deteriorating research environment in Turkey has rendered ulterior field 
research there highly problematic and not viable for the foreseeable future (Tek-
demir/Toivanen/Baser 2018). The second case study is based on fieldwork conducted in 
Colombia in early 2018 which resulted in a dozen interviews with former M-19 militants, 
commanders and sympathizers. It also draws on an array of M-19 primary source docu-
ments such as instructional manuals, party conference proceedings and internal publica-
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tions. These primary sources have been embedded in a wide-reaching analysis of the sec-
ondary literature on armed movements and their interactions with civilians and their sup-
porters. Therefore, the inductively formulated concepts and analyses of routinised insur-
gent space are subsequently validated by their contextualisation across a wide array of 
historically, ideologically and geographically distinct insurgent movements. 
This paper aspires to contribute to a better understanding of how insurgent movements 
establish supportive constituencies. It will clarify what kinds of initiatives allow insurgents, 
in simple terms, to get to know their immediate social environments and how they manage 
to structure their interactions with civilians in order to maintain their own security and deter 
collaboration with incumbent or adversarial movements, and ultimately how they obtain 
local popular legitimacy. An enhanced knowledge of insurgent support networks will con-
tribute to a better understanding of why certain armed groups successfully endure in spite 
of often significant structural disadvantages and fierce repression. It will facilitate a better 
understanding of the spatial variation of insurgent violence and it will potentially advance a 
conceptual framework to clarify how/if existing insurgent popular legitimacy and organised 
support networks can render an insurgent movement more or less likely to de-mobilise and 
to transform insurgent constituencies into electoral constituencies.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Armed groups are the product of relational and reciprocally formative interactions with an 
array of actors and institutions in their immediate social environments (Bosi/Demetriou/ 
Malthaner 2014; della Porta 2013; Viterna 2013; Ahmad 1982). A relational understanding 
underpins much contemporary research on political violence, especially the manner in 
which armed groups and contentious movements interact with the state and its allies 
(Goodwin 2001; Aras 2014; Almeida 2003; Aretxaga 2003). Alimi makes the further distinc-
tion between interactions with authorities and with security forces such as the police 
(2015). A further relational axis exists rooted in interactions between insurgent groups, civil 
society actors and political parties of broadly similar ideological orientations, (Mampilly 
2011a: 17; della Porta 2014). Aside from the literature by practitioners of violence, both 
insurgents and counter-insurgents (E. Guevara 1999; Petraeus 2013; Trinquier 1964; Army 
et al. 2012; Galula 2006; Lawrence 2016), lesser attention had been afforded to the rela-
tionship between armed groups and the communities which support them. However, this 
has begun to be more systematically addressed, in particular by the proponents of the rebel 
governance literature and recent relationally informed social movement research on vio-
lence. 
2.1 Rebel Governance 
Importantly, rebel governance is not a coherent singular field of research on political vio-
lence; it draws on earlier literature which specifically looks at armed groups’ interactions 
with their supporters (Wickham-Crowley 1987; Ahmad 1982) and more recent research 
(Staniland 2014; Viterna 2013; Wood 2003) which does not necessarily use the terminology 
of rebel governance but addresses similar phenomena. It has been summarised as “the set 
of actions insurgents engage in to regulate the social, political, and economic life of non-
combatants during war” (Arjona/Kasfir/Mampilly 2015: 3). Authors have emphasised dif-
ferent elements of rebel governance, such as civilian participation in insurgent governance 
(Kasfir 2005), the consolidation of insurgent legitimacy and service provision (Mampilly 
2011a) and analysis of the extent of governance and how it interacts with pre-existing polit-
icized forms of governance (Arjona 2016b).  
One of its scope conditions is that rebel groups must control territory. It generally puts forth 
a Kalyvasian inspired understanding of territorial control as a “the capacity of a rebel group 
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to keep its enemies out of a specific area” (Kasfir 2015: 26). Arjona argues that “the theory 
does not seek to explain social order in areas where armed organizations do not want to 
control territory” (2016b: 13). Kasfir acknowledges that territorial control is difficult to clear-
ly assess, accordingly, he argues for a weaker version of it: preponderant control (2015: 28). 
The emphasis on territorial control, even qualified definitions of it (Mampilly 2011a: 59), 
results in certain limitations.  
I. Firstly, armed movements do not necessarily wait until they control territory before 
engaging in forms of rebel governance, their efforts at governance can in fact be-
get control (see Jackson 2018: 25; Ledwidge 2017: 33). Intermittent and limited 
provision of rebel governance can be used to foster ties with local communities 
and build legitimacy before insurgent movements are in a position to control terri-
tory.  
II. Secondly, the vast majority of insurgent movements, or more precisely would-be 
insurgent movements, never obtain territorial control but they nevertheless engage 
in forms of incipient rebel governance. This is especially true of insurgent move-
ments with a substantial presence in urban areas as evidenced by many enduring 
guerrilla movements such as the IRA in Ireland (White and White 1991), the Tupa-
maros in Uruguay (Brum 2014), and indeed the M-19 (Le Blanc 2013) and the PKK’s 
activities in urban environments (O’Connor 2015). Insurgent groups must demon-
strate their competence and efficiency to their constituency even when they still 
operate clandestinely (Ahmad 1982: 249). This is even more important in light of 
technological developments, climate change and demographic trends which have 
hastened global urbanisation, leading to the view that most future conflicts will oc-
cur in urban contexts (Kilcullen 2015).  
III. Finally, insurgent movements do not control territory evenly; in certain areas they 
have territorial control while in others they have only a clandestine or periodic pres-
ence. As Che Guevara argued, insurgent movements must also make organization-
al efforts “not only within the liberated area, but also have connections in the adja-
cent areas. Precisely through these connections it is possible to penetrate a zone 
for a future enlargement of the guerrilla front”(2002: 81). Accordingly, an exagger-
ated fidelity to the concept of territorial control limits the remit of the field of rebel 
governance. 
2.2 Social Movement Studies 
Social Movement studies has expanded on its foundational pillars of political opportunity 
structure (J. M. Jasper/Goodwin 2011), resource mobilization (McCarthy/Zald 1977) and 
framing (Benford/Snow 2000) to incorporate a relational focus emphasising the dynamic 
and contingent elements of social change. Emirbayer has described this relational ontology 
as depicting “social reality in dynamic, continuous and processual terms, and sees relations 
between social terms and units as pre-eminently dynamic in nature, as unfolding, ongoing 
processes rather than as static ties among inert substance” (1997, 289; see Tilly 2015: 7; 
Alimi/Bosi/Demetriou 2015, Chapter 1; Tarrow 2008; Malthaner/Lindekilde 2017). This rela-
tional approach is key to understanding political violence by focusing “on interpersonal 
processes that promote, inhibit, or channel collective violence and connect it with nonvio-
lent politics” (Tilly 2003: 20). Nevertheless, a focus on the relationship between armed 
movements and their supporters is often overlooked even within this field (see for example 
Alimi 2015). Heretofore, the most conceptually systematic approach to this critical relation-
ship has been Malthaner’s work on insurgent constituencies (2011).  
Constituencies are defined as the “the real social groups in a society, whom the militants 
address and to whom they refer, with whom they are actually involved in some form of rela-
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tionship, and who – at least to a certain degree – actually sympathise with and support the 
militant groups” (Malthaner 2011: 29). They comprise four sets of relations. Firstly, drawing 
on the work of Joel Migdal (1975), there are relations of utilitarian social exchange: “stable 
and mutually rewarding relationships of exchange of benefits and support, and the gradual 
institutionalization of these exchange relationships which include mutual trust and obliga-
tions of reciprocity” (Malthaner 2011: 46). This overlaps with the service provision inherent 
in rebel governance (Arjona 2016b: 62). The second set of relations is derived from kin and 
family relations which encompass pre-existing bonds of trust, emotional commitment and 
reciprocal obligations (Malthaner 2011: 47). This results in the imbrication of the personal 
and the political, resulting in the reciprocal transformation of the insurgent movement and 
the constituency (Parkinson 2013) The third set is related to bonds forged endogenously to 
the insurgent mobilization. This incorporates elements of utilitarian exchange, whereby 
putative constituency members are convinced by the actions of the armed movement, be 
they in the provision of collective services or the targeting of existing enemies such as lo-
cally disliked landlords or criminals. Malthaner’s final set of relationships are rooted in 
communal solidarity, generally related to ascriptive identities and found amongst groups 
who share the perception of an existential threat from an external aggressor. The constitu-
ency is thus less broad than related concepts such as radical milieus and more territorial-
ised than radical networks (Malthaner/Waldmann 2014). It is also more conceptually pre-
cise than similar concepts such as Staniland’s “social base” (2014: 18) or Orhan’s different 
use of the same term (2015: 99).  
There are three key elements of the constituency that demand further elaboration: the role 
of territorial control, civilian agency vis-à-vis insurgent movements and the process of in-
surgent legitimacy building. 
Territorial Control 
Regarding the first, the use of the constituency as a concept is not intended to dismiss the 
importance of territorial control. The constituency remains a territorialised concept, rela-
tions between an armed group and supporters are certainly shaped by their immediate 
social environment and local socio-spatial dynamics and balances of power. Interactions 
between a guerrilla unit and villagers in a mountainous district, days march from any mili-
tary or police outpost are qualitatively different to interactions between a guerrilla unit 
forced to operate clandestinely in a city4. However, the constitutive elements of the constit-
uency-armed group relationship are the ties between them rather than the shared existence 
in a given territory or even belonging to a particular ethnic or religious group. As a concept it 
is flexible enough to address the mass demographic volatility of conflict, related to forced 
displacement and migration of an insurgent’s constituency. Nevertheless, it is incontrovert-
ible that groups which boast territorial control have much greater flexibility and capacity 
regarding how they interact with their constituency. One only has to consider the cases of 
groups like Hamas (Berti 2015) or the Taliban (Baczko 2013) and how their territorial con-
trol has allowed their presence to become more institutionalised and take the form of terri-
torialised governance akin to an emerging state. Yet, the absence of territorial control has 
not impeded the significant numbers of insurgent groups from implementing elements of 
rebel governance as a means to obtain popular legitimacy and to establish resilient sup-
portive constituencies. Similarly to Kalyvas’ paradox of which comes first, control or collab-
oration, one could discuss whether it is popular legitimacy that begets an insurgent constit-
uency or vice versa. Of course, the answer is that it is a composite process: latent insurgent 
                                                 
 
4  In Murat Haner’s (2018) biography of a PKK guerrilla this is made very clear in the protagonist’s description 
of his experiences in mountain villages sympathetic to the movement, pro-state paramilitary villages and in 
the cities.  
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legitimacy due to communal bonds, historical continuities or incumbent violence is rein-
forced by insurgent accomplishments and where insurgent legitimacy is less well rooted, 
its performance and behaviour can endogenously generate legitimacy.  
Accordingly, the insurgent constituency is a concept ideally suited for analysing groups 
which do not boast territorial control. It can facilitate an analysis of early phase insurgent 
mobilisation which of course can evolve to obtain territorial control, or – as in the case of 
the majority of insurgent movements – fail to develop beyond small armed cells with lim-
ited popular support. Additionally, it is an apt approach to analyse the margins of insurgent 
territorial control. If an armed group controls a delimited territory but has wider geograph-
ical objectives, they are consequently likely to be contemporarily active in areas where they 
have territorial control and ones in which they only have a form of social control. Finally, it is 
arguably better equipped to address armed movements which operate in urban contexts 
where there is a much lower likelihood of insurgent territorial control. 
Insurgent Legitimacy 
Insurgent support itself demands further explanation: Arjona disaggregates it into obedi-
ence, spontaneous support and enlistment (2017). Obedience entails complying with insur-
gent groups commands, spontaneous support includes providing voluntarily assistance to 
them and enlistment means actively joining the movement in some role, not necessarily as 
a combatant (Arjona 2017: 762). It has alternatively been categorised as voluntary, quasi-
voluntary and coercive compliance (Podder 2017: 687). Arjona argues that insurgent 
movements require at least some spontaneous support and a massive degree of obedi-
ence if they are to successfully operate. Once the basic condition of obedience is achieved, 
insurgent movements can proceed to strengthen their local support through a combination 
of maintaining order by the use of selective violence and by providing forms of rebel gov-
ernance (Arjona 2017). Malthaner describes insurgent support relationships as “as dynamic 
patterns of mutual orientation, dependency and influence emerging from sustained interac-
tion and exchange between armed groups and certain parts of a population, which entail an 
element of non-coerced (active or passive) collaboration on the part of that population” 
(2015: 429).  
If armed groups are to obtain a degree of non-coerced support and a broader array of com-
pliance, they must be recognised as possessing a degree of legitimacy. Legitimacy can be 
understood as a “the belief in the justification or the moral validity of a political organisation 
and its activities (Schneckener 2017: 803) and is usually reflective of “local norms, identi-
ties and realities which resonate with target populations” (Worrall 2017: 715). Armed 
groups without a minimum of legitimacy are doomed to fail as obtaining compliance 
through coercion is simply too labour intensive and exhausting, leading to a loss of morale 
and coherence for insurgent movements (Duyvesteyn 2017: 672–73). Legitimacy is not an 
innate quality; rather it is an interactive and ongoing process (Demetriou 2007: 174). Even 
the classic Weberian understanding of charismatic legitimacy can be interpreted as only 
being realised when it is acknowledged by a leader’s followers (Joosse 2014: 271). It is 
therefore a process in constant re-negotiation and as a result, a group viewed as having 
legitimacy at one particular time and place can, at a time thereafter, be perceived as illegit-
imate. Maintenance of legitimacy is particularly challenging for armed groups as violence 
can serve as a both a legitimising and de-legitimising impact. Violence perceived as defen-
sive and protecting the community can enhance legitimacy but violence viewed as unwar-
ranted or incongruent with local norms can have the opposite effect (Schlich-
te/Schneckener 2015: 415; Al-Tamimi 2018; Uležić 2018). 
Yet, violence is not the only means of garnering legitimacy for armed groups, they can also 
possess forms of symbolic or performative legitimacy (Schlichte/Schneckener 2015: 418). 
They can derive legitimacy from their origins or a shared communal background (Mampilly 
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2011b: 75), as the inheritors of a specific revolutionary or national tradition. Prior to being 
ensconced or as in the halls of power in the Kurdish regional government in Iraq, the Barza-
ni family were a good example of such a form of trans-generational legitimacy. Alternative-
ly, an armed group that is seen as particularly brave or willing to sacrifice itself for its ‘peo-
ple’ or endure similar privations can garner legitimacy for example the EZLN in Chiapas in 
Mexico prior to its 1994 uprising (O’Connor/Oikonomakis 2015). Certain charismatic lead-
ers (e.g. Abdullah Öcalan in the PKK or Velupillai Prabhakaran in the LTTE) generate a de-
gree of legitimacy, invested in their person which is then transfused through their move-
ments (Nepstad/Bob 2006: 2; Gerdes 2015). Performative legitimacy can be obtained 
through delivery-based legitimization (Giustozzi 2012: 193) by the provision of forms of 
insurgent services and the maintenance of order as previously addressed in the discussion 
of rebel governance.  
Legitimacy is particularly important for insurgent movements in locations and phases 
where they do not possess territorial control, when they are more vulnerable to detection by 
state security forces. The quest for legitimacy arises in the early phases of insurgent trajec-
tories (Schlichte/Schneckener 2015: 410). Yet, as evidenced by the majority of armed 
groups which manage to survive periods of initial vulnerability, nascent legitimacy is suffi-
cient to generate some social control, which is then key to obtaining insurgent support. 
Compliance in areas of social control is maintained by the collective imposition of mecha-
nisms of social sanction upon those which stray from the orientation of the local communi-
ty. Such mechanisms of control are founded on “mutual surveillance by community mem-
bers” and include “forms of social ostracism, public shaming, and exclusion and isola-
tion”(Malthaner 2015: 433). Although, these social sanctions are configured in the context 
of the implicit or potential threat of insurgent retribution, most social sanctioning is actually 
enforced by the broader constituency rather than the armed group itself (Sluka 1989: 135–
36). Over time, the internalisation of norms expounded by insurgent organisations leads to 
a form of hegemonic compliance (Bosi 2013: 81). Popular legitimacy allows insurgent 
movements to survive and expand because it facilitates insurgent social control. Thus 
forms of symbolic legitimacy, bolstered by various forms of performative legitimacy – ser-
vice provision or combat performance – lead to social control which facilitates the consoli-
dation of an insurgent constituency and, subject to other factors, can lead to territorial con-
trol. 
Civilian Agency  
As mentioned above, the constituency is a relational concept, located in the constantly 
evolving back and forth between armed movements and civilians. It is therefore strongly 
shaped by the agency of the involved civilians. It must be acknowledged that armed group-
constituency interactions develop in a context characterised by the potential deployment of 
insurgent violence (Mazower 2001: 132) yet it is not simply a unidirectional imposition of 
force by the stronger on the weaker (Arjona 2016a). Civilians can contest insurgent pres-
ence in a number of fashions. Arjona disaggregates civilian disobedience vis-à-vis insurgent 
authority into resistance, defection or migration (2017: 762). Civilians have numerous, albeit 
often arduous options, in contexts of prolonged insurgent violence; they can often seek 
support from other armed actors (Weinstein 2007: 203; Sanín 2008) or establish (usually in 
conjunction with the state) paramilitary associations such as the rondas campesinas in 
Peru (Degregori 2005), Village Guards in Kurdistan (Özar/Uçarlar/Aytar 2013) or patriot 
militias in Algeria (Martinez 2000: 151–55). Furthermore, armed groups are not always 
better armed than civilians. Certain societies, particularly rural and tribally constituted ones, 
are often in possession of relatively heavy weapons and proficient in their use (Haner 2018: 
51; O’Connor 2014: 181). Weak insurgent military capacity is particularly relevant in the 
early stages of insurgent group formation (O’Connor/Oikonomakis 2015). Civilians can also 
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make use of a broader range of culturally specific forms of resistance (Arjona 2015; Rap-
paport 2007) and there have been multiple instances of non-violent resistance against both 
insurgent and state forces in Colombian peace communities (Masullo Jiménez 2017). 
Accordingly, although armed groups commonly possess the means of coercing their con-
stituency, this relative strength is not consistently available, and its deployment would risk 
undermining their symbolic and political legitimacy. Although armed groups can obtain 
legitimacy from different audiences i.e. from associations with the state (Schneckener 
2017) or via national or international recognition (Podder 2017: 688), one can argue that 
ongoing symbolic validation by the constituency is the principal source of symbolic legiti-
macy for armed actors (Ahmad 1982: 246). It is central to insurgent movements’ morale 
that the people they claim to represent and regularly interact with, acknowledge their efforts 
and co-operate with their demands to a certain extent. It is also true that many militants do 
not necessarily venture far from their home areas (Goodwin 1997), and thus, is if they were 
to experience rejection by their constituency, it would be a personal as well as a political 
rejection. As a symbolic acknowledgement by their constituency is a crucial part of insur-
gent self-identity, it behoves insurgents to respect the normative limits of the constituency 
(Guillén 1982: 320; Falciola 2015: 258). These normative parameters are not fixed and 
evolve over the course of a conflict, tolerating more intensive forms of violence in certain 
stages which would previously or subsequently be regarded as excessive (Beissinger 2002: 
40; Casanova 2005).This was well summed-up by former IRA member Eamonn Collins who 
claimed that when the IRA formulated its armed strategy, they “knew they were operating 
within a powerful set of informal restrictions on their behaviour, no less powerful for being 
largely unspoken” (1997: 295). The persistent breaching of these normative limits can de-
finitively undermine insurgent support networks as in the case of ASALA (Dugan et al. 2008: 
236). 
In summary, the synthesis of the rebel governance approach and relational ontology of 
recent work on violence by social movements’ scholars is well suited to addressing the 
entirety of insurgent movement trajectories. More specifically it allows a fine-grained analy-
sis of how insurgent movements form the supportive constituencies necessary for their 
own self-perception as legitimate political actors and for obtaining the material support 
need to maintain an armed movement. Yet, rebel governance is characterised by a degree 
of chronological limitations, failing to explain earlier phases of insurgent mobilisation and 
the margins of insurgent control and presence. Social movement studies are not wholly 
suited for analysing insurgent consolidation and remain somewhat conceptually fragment-
ed. Nevertheless, the approach outlined in this paper fuses the both schools and comple-
ments it with a strong spatial focus on the micro-spaces where armed groups interact with 
their supporters. 
3. ROUTINISED INSURGENT SPACES 
3.1 Conceptual Clarification 
The first methodological step in any research agenda is the conceptual clarification of the 
category to be explained (George 2019; Sartori 1970; Mair 2008). Drawing on Goertz’s 
(2006) understanding of conceptual development, Routinised insurgent space is conceptu-
alised according to its necessary and sufficient conditions. In order to differentiate RIS from 
other interactions between armed groups and civilians, such as purely coercive or violent 
ones, from coincidental interactions between armed groups and civilian bystanders (e.g. 
when militants encounter shepherds or farmers while passing from one area to another), 
from urgent unplanned interactions (e.g. when militants need medical aid or basic necessi-
ties) from rhetorical and communicative interactions which do not entail interpersonal en-
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gagement (e.g. media or online propaganda), and from unknowing interactions (e.g. when 
militants deliberately conceal their identities from civilians), it is necessary to list RIS’ nec-
essary conditions. For interactions to be categorized as occurring in a context of RIS it is 
necessary to have 1) an armed group deliberately and strategically engaging with its con-
stituency or putative constituency, and 2) these interactions must occur in specific spaces 
selected by the armed group. This coincides with a minimal conceptual understanding as it 
includes “all definitional attributes that are necessary and, therefore are always pre-
sent”(Gerring and Barresi 2013: 207). It is accordingly minimal in attributes but maximal in 
extensional range, rendering it apt to address the universality of armed groups’ efforts to 
earn and maintain legitimacy through interactions with their constituencies. In light of 
Goertz’s substitutability test, if either of these two elements are absent, it is not an instance 
of a RIS but rather one of the aforementioned alternative potential forms of interactions, 
therefore as a concept its better structured according to its necessary and sufficient condi-
tions rather than family resemblance (2006: 45). According to Satori’s ladder of abstraction 
(1970: 1044), RIS is a medium-level category and its composite forms (insurgent service 
provision, prison organization etc.) are lower-level categories, whose sufficient conditions 
are highly context dependent and reflect dynamic structural and relational factors, across 
and also within case studies. 
Insurgent groups’ relationships with their supporters have been classed as “distinct rela-
tional arena” (Malthaner 2015: 429), routinised insurgent spaces on the other hand address 
the specific spatial component of this relational arena. Insurgent movements appropriate 
space “to mobilize as a resource for their goals and to change symbolic meanings” 
(O’Hearn 2009: 494) and more specifically, routinized insurgent spaces can be understood 
as specific spaces in which armed group-constituency relations are ordered and routinized. 
In early phases of insurgency, encounters between militants and potential supporters occur 
in open non-politicised spaces, often outdoors or in shared spaces like religious centres or 
even in private dwellings. However, as insurgent groups’ presence is consolidated (not nec-
essarily to the point of territorial control), they begin to engineer spaces which are specifi-
cally imbued with symbolic and political relevance. These spaces serve as loci for a range 
of interactions of utilitarian social exchange (insurgent courts systems, schools or markets) 
and ritualised symbolically laden events (funerals, martyrs’ commemorations or rallies). It 
must be emphasized that all civilians who encounter rebel groups in routinized insurgent 
spaces are not a priori politicized or even well-disposed to the insurgent movement. Often 
times in the absence of alternatives they simply need to avail of services exclusively availa-
ble in such settings or are either implicitly or explicitly pressured by groups to engage with 
them. Over time, the interactions which accrue in these routinized insurgent spaces facili-
tate emotional ties, political socialization and popular legitimacy.  
These routinized insurgent spaces are influenced by the phases of insurgency and the envi-
ronments in which they occur. Territorial control facilitates a more institutionalized form of 
routinized insurgent space, including concrete infrastructure such as hospitals or border 
crossings staffed by fulltime movement cadres (Mampilly 2011b: 93, 120). In areas charac-
terised by social control, particularly in urban contexts, they are more fleeting and flexible. 
To give a concrete example, an insurgent court could sit regularly in a specific recognised 
building and be open to the public in an insurgent controlled rural village as in cases of Tal-
eban courts in Afghanistan (Jackson 2018; Baczko 2013). On the other hand, in an urban 
context controlled by the state, it might be clandestinely held in private residences. None-
theless, these spaces have similar aspirations to generate greater ties with insurgent con-
stituencies and consolidate a specific insurgent designed spatial ordering. These routinized 
insurgent spaces serve as sites of socialization and reinforcement of insurgent legitimacy. 
They result in the stabilisation of an insurgent habitus in its dealings with its constituency in 
terms of language and discourse used, rituals observed, and reconfiguration of prevailing 
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social norms related to gender, class and age. Norms of interaction are informed by both 
the constituency and the armed group. As Ahmad argues “the symbols of revolution and 
styles of leadership derive heavily from the local culture and constitute the creative links 
between the old and the new, between the mystical and the rational bases of legitimacy” 
(1982: 251).  
3.2 Social Ties 
The location where social ties are formed can strongly influence their subsequent devel-
opment, the likelihood of their subsequent maintenance and the emotional salience with 
which they are attributed. A tie formed in prison between a non-militant and a political pris-
oner in the context of the brutalities of prison life is likely to be more emotionally intense 
than a social tie formed between a clandestine militant and a potential sympathiser on a 
university campus. Accordingly, routinised insurgent spaces are designed to bestow emer-
gent social ties with credibility (the movement is serious and committed in what it says and 
does) and emotional resonance (the movement is willing to sacrifice itself and genuinely 
cares about the broader community). As previously discussed, social ties and networks are 
a well-established means of analysing insurgent movements’ growth and recruitment. Pas-
sy identified three functions of social ties: socialization, structural-connection and decision-
making (2001). As an armed group’s constituency develops, these ties become more nu-
merous and inevitably more varied. Additionally, the nature and function of what seems to 
be ostensibly the same form of tie can be very different at different phases of insurgent 
mobilization. If we take the case of family or kin ties (Malthaner 2011: 47): in an armed 
group’s early phase of constituency formation, recruitment is often conducted through fam-
ily and peer networks in familiar spaces (White 1993: 38; Bosi/della Porta 2012; Viterna 
2006; Tezcür 2016; Sageman 2008). In this period, the structural gap between an individual 
and a movement is diminished when one has a sibling or friend within the movement (Pas-
sy 2001: 174). Reciprocal responsibilities of ‘taking care of your family’ can induce siblings 
to join in order to protect or lessen the potential danger to a brother or sister. Alternatively, 
having a family member or a peer within a group can de-mystify it and make it less alien, 
thus easing participation. At this phase of constituency establishment, routinised insurgent 
spaces are relatively underdeveloped. In subsequent phases of constituency maintenance, 
when movements are larger and hierarchically structured, having a family member involved 
could involve a different route to membership.  
Another variation of a family tie is related to having family members who have been ‘mar-
tyred’ in fighting (Moghadam 2011) or imprisoned (Letamendia 2012). Although still a fami-
ly or kin tie, it is a very different one to accompanying one’s sibling to a revolutionary meet-
ing in the relatively safe confines of a university or a café in early insurgent phases. These 
ties are reinforced in more sophisticated forms of RIS, like martyr or prisoner associations. 
Later, family ties are laden with greater emotional resonance, bolstered by feelings of 
vengefulness or fear. Movements are cognisant of the emotional potential of such ties and 
promote specific events and practices targeting family ties to strengthen its constituency: 
examples of such, are the founding of prisoner support groups or, even more potently, the 
politicization of funerals and the commemoration of martyrs (Khalili 2007). However, one 
needs to be cautious to avoid adopting an overly-deterministic approach to understanding 
family ties. On certain occasions, prevailing family ties and inherent responsibilities can, in 
fact, restrain potential recruits from joining groups (Malthaner/Lindekilde 2017). In others, 
the abandonment of familial responsibilities for an insurgent group can antagonize local 
populations (Goodwin 1997). Fears that armed groups intend to recruit – forcibly or through 
persuasion – local youths can lead to the formation of pro-state paramilitary groups to pre-
empt further insurgent mobilisation. Finally, many individuals often fall under the influence 
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of peers or other individuals and adopt strikingly different political and religious positions to 
their families (O’Connor 2014: 226). 
A more spatially informed and chronologically disaggregated analysis of the ties which bind 
insurgents to their constituencies is needed to account for the reality that the majority of 
potential recruits in insurgent groups’ immediate social environments do not actually be-
come insurgents (Viterna 2013: 44). A dynamic conceptualization of ties also avoids their 
reification and can explain why certain mobilization and recruitment tactics successfully 
employed in one phase of the conflict can prove to be less useful in others.  
3.3  Time 
Time should be understood as less a question of the “abstract historical processes” cri-
tiqued by Sewell (1996: 247) but rather as series of particular events. Armed group’s con-
stituencies are in a perpetual process of re-constitution; supporters become insurgents, 
supporters are imprisoned, supporters are forced or choose to migrate, become disillu-
sioned and defect to other parties or simply disengage from any active political engage-
ments. It is therefore not possible to identify a single specific point when a constituency 
transitions from establishment to maintenance. Nevertheless, there is a strong chronologi-
cal distinction between armed groups incipient phases of mobilisation and subsequent 
phases once they are consolidated. This, of course, also applies to the extent and compre-
hensiveness of RIS: in simple terms, RIS is more inconsistent in earlier phases of mobilisa-
tion and potentially more developed and consistent in later ones. 
 It has been documented that founding generations of insurgents differ dramatically from 
subsequent ones. With later ones socialized in a context of violence and usually – when 
they are successful – insurgent recruitment expands to different demographics 
(O’Connor/Oikonomakis 2015; Moyano 1992; Tarrow 1993: 167; Johnston 2014: 37–39; 
Aydin/Emrence 2015: 19). Thus, early generations of insurgents interact in a very different 
fashion with their nascent constituency than in later phases. In the initial phase of constitu-
ency building, armed groups are dependent on pre-existing social networks, as they can 
offer little in the way of utilitarian social exchange and there are limited ties endogenous to 
the nascent mobilisation. However, a creative manipulation of pre-existing ties, not simply 
familial or friendship ones, often related to weak ties forged in non-clandestine political 
mobilisation in university politics or trade union activities can facilitate the emergence of a 
constituency (Staniland 2014: 9). This is particularly true in authoritarian contexts wherein 
emotionally salient ties are formed in settings like prisons or amongst communities directly 
impacted by violent state excesses. An ulterior type of tie making in this phase is the judi-
cious use of violence – in an antagonistic or defensive fashion – against adversaries, which 
are not so militarily potent as to risk insurgent movements’ immediate liquidation by chal-
lenging them. Typically, this could entail providing protection against violent opponents 
such as political gangs or attacking local contentious figures such as landlords or disliked 
bosses or officials.  
In later phases of constituency consolidation, insurgents are capable of engaging in more 
substantial forms of utilitarian social exchange or forging a nascent counter-state replete 
with an implicit insurgent social contract (Wickham-Crowley 1987: 494). In addition to 
providing popular legitimacy, the provision of services also serves as a practical means of 
engineering initial contact with civilians beyond insurgents’ existing networks. These initial 
points of interaction have been referred to as “moments of encounter” (O’Connor/ 
Oikonomakis 2015). The engineering of non-conflictual spaces where insurgents provide 
necessary services or simply the possibility to present themselves in a non-hostile fashion 
are crucial for breaking down civilians’ suspicions. These moments of encounter can range 
from the distribution of ‘appropriated’ wellingtons as was common amongst M-19 guerrillas 
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in Pasto in Southern Colombia (Personal interview Germany, M-19 guerrilla, 2017), the visit 
of an insurgent doctor (Wickham-Crowley 1987: 483) or the provision of armed support to 
striking workers (Villamizar 2002: 341). These encounters serve as means to socialize 
members of the broader public into adopting a “participant identity” (Viterna 2013: 51). 
Insurgent support in phases of constituency maintenance can be reinforced by practises of 
state repression. Indiscriminate state repression commonly results in accentuating pre-
existing grievances and consolidating solidarity with insurgents (Almeida 2003; Orhan 
2015; Goodwin 2001: 188–169; Bosi/della Porta 2012; Wood 2003; Aras 2014; Hafez 2003; 
Malthaner 2015). 
Insurgent movements’ trajectories and their accordant relationship with their constituen-
cies vary dramatically from early phases of weakness and pronounced vulnerability, periods 
of consolidation and ultimately either decline or transformation through victory. The nexus 
of social ties and where they occur, binding armed groups to their constituencies, changes 
significantly across phases of insurgent activity.  
3.4  Spatial Dynamics 
The empirical particularities of armed groups’ relational axes (vis-à-vis the state and allied 
groups, other political actors, and constituencies) must be considered in light of the ‘spatial 
turn’ of the social sciences (Gambetti/Jongerden 2011; Ò Dochartaigh 2015; Sewell Jr. 
2001; Springer/Le Billon 2016). Inspired by some of the defining work on space conducted 
by social geographers, space is not understood as a natural phenomenon to be quantified 
and controlled but rather as a phenomenon that it is always “contested and conflictual in so 
far as social relations and spatial formations are mutually constitutive” (Dikeç 2016: 5). A 
point redolent of Massey’s assertion that as “there are no purely spatial processes, neither 
are there any non-spatial social processes.” (1995: 51). The inherently spatial component of 
relationality (Dikeç 2016: 1) has heretofore not been made explicit regarding the relations 
between armed movements and their sympathisers and broader civilian populations. By 
understanding space as a contested realm rather than simply a neutral terrain from which 
to better extract resources, it allows one to acknowledge its use by insurgent movements to 
reconfigure “symbolic meanings” (O’Hearn 2009: 494) and generate alternative political 
imaginaries. RIS’ conceptual origins accordingly bridge the reciprocally formative relations 
between armed movements and other actors and institutions in their immediate social 
environment, embedded in shifting balances of power derived in spatial contestation. Con-
testation is more nuanced than the question of ‘territorial control’, thus allowing an analysis 
of armed groups’ clandestine operations and incremental presence in areas of state domi-
nation, as a means of naturalising their informal insurgent practises and institutions. 
As Bosi has explained, “space is not a ‘natural’ unit to which individuals adjust but a social 
artefact, structured through the interactions of people, groups, and institutions that are 
embedded in specific social relations” (2013: 82). Although physical geographic features 
such as mountains or forests remain integral to understanding space, emphasis has shifted 
to the ‘spatial agency’ of social actors and the way they shape their socio-spatial environ-
ments. Focus lies on the “fashion in which spatial constraints are turned to advantage in 
political and social struggles and the ways that such struggles can restructure the mean-
ings, uses and strategic valence of space” (Sewell, 2001:55). Yet, “there is a radical spatial 
unevenness to violence that defies explanation at the national level” and that most “violent 
conflicts extend across less than one quarter of the area of the states in which they take 
place”(Ó Dochartaigh 2013: 120). One cannot therefore generalise at the level of the state, 
or even region, in terms of the diffusion of insurgency. Accordingly, one must incorporate 
an awareness of the broader spatial dimensions, such as physical geography (e.g. in moun-
tainous or jungle areas), geostrategic elements (e.g. within which state boundaries, or prox-
imity to borders), into the micro-level analysis of RIS.  
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An intuitive and rather widespread approach to analyse violence is to distinguish between 
urban and rural insurgency (de la Calle 2015). It has long been held that “insurgents tend to 
be universally weak in cities” due to the ease with which incumbent forces can “police and 
monitor the population” (Kalyvas 2006:133). Fidel Castro went so far as to declare the city 
the graveyard of the revolutionary (in Ibrahim 2004: 121) Yet, there have been numerous 
urban insurgent campaigns across the globe (Staniland 2010; Kilcullen 2015; Le Blanc 
2013; Lomax 2015), and they are arguably becoming ever more recurrent as in recent ex-
amples of the ISIS seizure of the city of Marawi in the Philippines (Knight/Theodorakis 
2018) and the massive urban component of the ongoing conflict in Syria and Iraq. Further-
more, the boundaries between ‘urban’ and ‘rural’ are often dramatically re-configured in 
times of conflict. Prolonged conflict inevitably results in population displacement; rural 
isolated communities relocate to the relative safety of urban environments, congregating in 
improvised provisional neighbourhoods or in refugee camps. These movements of popula-
tion can be an integral part of states counter-insurgency efforts (Kalyvas 2006: 123; 
Jongerden 2007) or more spontaneous and temporary in nature. Rural migrants tend to re-
settle collectively in urban centres thus maintaining rural customs and practises and pre-
existing solidarity networks (Marr 2004: 167; Grabolle-Çeliker 2012; Wedel 2001). Therefore, 
in times of conflict, the distinction between the rural and the urban is not necessarily as 
clear as might be imagined. The concept of constituency because it is not territorially fixed, 
is a particularly apt conceptual tool to track ongoing insurgent group-supporters’ relations 
across dramatically reconfigured socio-spatial environments. A displaced or refugee, peas-
ant sympathiser of a particular movement does not necessarily cease to support the 
movement simply because they have been relocated to a different environment. Indeed, 
their support for the movement may have even increased. A focus on the insurgent constit-
uency as a relational construct, territorially influenced but not determined, in contrast to 
territorially rooted concepts like Waldmann’s “radical community” (2005: 254), allows a 
protracted analysis of the actors actually under study rather than spatial reference points 
which may be of less relevance.  
The specific advantages and disadvantages inherent to the establishment of RIS in urban 
and rural contexts merit further examination. It is generally more common for insurgents in 
rural areas to possess a degree of territorial control. The relative security for insurgents in 
isolated rural areas facilitates prolonged and more open interactions with their constituen-
cy and more comprehensive forms of RIS, such as regular insurgent courts and more con-
solidated forms of insurgent service provision. Extended exposure to guerrillas allows the 
cementing of greater bonds of emotional and interpersonal solidarity with local residents. 
This emotional imbrication between insurgents and supporters consolidates and sustains 
insurgents’ motivation to continue the struggle and emboldens supporters to become more 
active in their support. Additionally, insurgents can provide a more institutionalized form of 
insurgent service provision. The appropriation of buildings for use as hospitals or schools 
or even more substantially, the implementation of land reform granting the use or title of 
land to peasants (Wickham-Crowley 1987; Ledwidge 2017: 39).  
Conversely, both time and space in urban contexts is a more constrained resource, alt-
hough on occasions where insurgents can safely engage in constituency building in urban 
centres they can encounter vastly increased numbers of potential supporters and sympa-
thisers, rendering it more time effective. As the revolutionary theorist Abraham Guillén as-
serted ‘[…] the revolutionary potential is where the population is” (1982: 317). For example, 
when an armed group punishes a gang of petty criminals in an urban neighbourhood, this 
provides a concrete benefit to a much larger number of people than an analogous punish-
ment of a rural cattle thief. Although the natural cover of physical geography is absent in 
cities, populous slum neighbourhoods and somewhat paradoxically upper-class neighbour-
hoods can all provide different forms of social camouflage (Ibrahim 2004: 121). An aware-
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ness of this urban potential influenced the M-19’s strategic planning when it “decided to 
operate in zones of economic and geopolitical importance, where the masses were the 
guerrillas’ forest rather than in an actual forest, where the [guerrilla forces] would be isolat-
ed”(Navarro Wolff in Jiménez Ricárdez 1986)5. It must also be recalled that insurgent 
movements often re-encounter displaced rural dwellers with whom they had some form of 
relationship in the countryside, thus it is often a question of re-connecting with their existing 
constituency in a different spatial environment.  
4. FORMS OF ROUTINISED INSURGENT SPACE 
4.1 Insurgent systems of justice and policing 
One of the first initiatives with which insurgent movements are tasked is the maintenance 
of security in order to deter defection, preserve their own operational security and to consol-
idate their popular legitimacy with their constituency by providing broader security and sta-
bility. Insurgent policing services are concrete occasions and a nascent space where con-
stituency members knowingly and actively interact with the insurgent movement and be-
come socialized into their broader political vision. Mampilly argues that this is a necessary 
first step in rebel governance which is usually then followed by the establishment of some 
form of dispute resolution mechanism or alternative juridical system (2011b: 17; Wickham-
Crowley 1990,: 482; Jackson 2018: 7). In instances of stronger territorial control, revolution-
ary courts can become institutionalised, open to the public scrutiny and staffed by a rela-
tively independent judiciary, as in the case of the IRA’s Dáil courts in Ireland (Kotsonouris 
1994), the Taleban courts in some areas of Afghanistan (Jackson 2018; Baczko 2013) or 
the courts operated in Greece by the EAM during the Nazi occupation (Stavrianos 1952: 84; 
Charitopoulos 2012). However, in most cases of insurgency, particularly in urban areas, 
insurgent justice tends to develop in a more inconsistent fashion and is primarily realised at 
the level of policing at the grassroots level. This often occurs in areas with very limited in-
surgent territorial control and is thus reliant on the broader public accepting the alternative 
justice systems as more legitimate than the incumbent one and actively engaging with the 
system. Additionally, the targeting of locally disreputable elements often occurs in the very 
early stages of insurgent mobilization, as it demands relatively low investment of insurgent 
resources and can result in immediate popularity dividends. 
 In times of conflict, parallel to ostensibly political violence, there is often a rise in more 
common everyday crime, where criminals opportunistically take advantage of the break-
down of formal authority (Munck 1984: 89). On occasion, non-political criminality may be 
deliberately allowed to flourish by state authorities as a way of creating upheaval in insur-
gent sympathetic communities (Darici 2011; Munck 1984: 87). Therefore, insurgent move-
ments that are seen as capable of restoring a semblance of order to society - albeit through 
violent means – often garner immense popular support, at least initially (Wickham-Crowley 
1987: 489; Gutiérrez Sanín 2015; Munck 1984; Ledwidge 2017: 74). However, armed 
movements engagement in policing their constituencies is not always a priority and it can 
even lead to reputational costs. It can divert resources away from the principal objective of 
fighting one’s opponents and, given the lower burden of evidence inherent in much insur-
gent policing, it provides a platform for malicious denunciation (Gutiérrez Sanín 2015: 263; 
Baczko 2013: 105). Additionally, in the absence of rigorous oversight or rivalry between 
different movements’ approaches to policing, it can degenerate into vigilantism (Lia 2006: 
                                                 
 
5  Author’s own translation. 
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66), become involved with the very criminal elements it was intended to police (Sanín/ 
Jaramillo 2004) or evolve into a politicised ethnic militia (Harnischfeger 2003). 
Nonetheless, the provision of policing and juridical services is a central pillar of the majority 
of insurgent organisations. As Arjona argues “rebels quickly learn that gaps in dispute insti-
tutions offer a unique opportunity to penetrate a community, obtain information about its 
members and their networks, gain legitimacy, and control civilian behavior. Once their dis-
pute institutions established by the armed group become the preferred mechanism for 
adjudicating disputes, the organization becomes a central figure in the community” (2016b: 
73). However, insurgent justice systems must be consistent with prevailing local social 
orders (Worrall 2017: 717), as in the case of Somalia where the Union of Islamic Courts 
combined customary clan dispute resolution norms with Islamic jurisprudence (Mwangi 
2010). In the case of the Taliban courts, they more easily gained local recognition as legiti-
mate due to locals’ familiarity and respect for Islamic law (Baczko 2013: 125), but the 
courts were nevertheless also cognizant of local non-Islamic norms and did not challenge 
them (Jackson 2018: 19).  
A fundamental feature of successful court systems is the capacity to guarantee enforce-
ment of the judgments passed by the court (Ledwidge 2017: 71), and once the likelihood of 
enforcement is understood locally, the majority of disputes are resolved through mediation 
without the need for recourse to violent punishment. Nevertheless, the form of punish-
ments implemented must also be attuned to local norms. In the case of a militia in the Igbo 
region of southern Nigeria, the Bakassi Boys drew on an explicitly anti-Western understand-
ing of justice, juxtaposed with the formal court system significantly shaped by colonial insti-
tutions. The Bakassi Boys claimed to possess magical powers – which co-exist with local 
Christian beliefs – that helped them to accurately judge suspects innocence or guilt 
(Harnischfeger 2003: 32). The guilty were then punished by being brutally hacked to death 
in public areas6 before being set alight. Although the Bakassi Boys’ investigation of sus-
pects was completely secret and the crimes of the punished were not even publicized, the 
justice of the Bakassi boys maintained popular support because of their connections with 
the occult and perceived lack of corruption (Harnischfeger 2003: 31). In other forms of in-
surgent justice, punishments are less violent. In rural areas of southern Colombia, the M-19 
sentenced people engaged in domestic abuse or minor thievery to a period of labour for the 
communal good such as repairing irrigation systems or bridges. In cases of persistent 
crime or violence, they executed offenders (Personal Interviews, Bogota 2018). In Ireland, 
the IRA had a scale of punishment ranging from head-shaving, tarring and feathering, beat-
ings, non-lethal shootings, exile and execution. Even within these type of punishments there 
was variation according to where one was shot, in the knee or the thigh and which caliber of 
ammunition was used, according to the gravity of the crime or personal connections with 
members of the movement (Monaghan 2004: 444). Even opaque and brutal forms of insur-
gent justice can maintain popular support when they are viewed as relatively fair and not 
corrupt, and they do not contravene local norms (Wickham-Crowley 1987: 489).  
4.2 Insurgent service provision 
After a degree of security for both the movement and the local population has been estab-
lished (Wickham-Crowley 1987: 482), insurgents’ next move is commonly the provision of 
certain insurgent services. The scale of service provision varies dramatically; at the more 
comprehensive end of the spectrum movements like FARC provided “substantial services 
to the inhabitants of its territory, including health and education systems, a police force to 
maintain stability, courts to adjudicate civil and criminal disputes, and even loans to farm-
                                                 
 
6  The killing of an accused sorcerer drew a crowd of 20,000 people (Harnischfeger 2003: 35). 
17 
 
PRIF Working Paper No. 44 
ers and small businessmen. It also engaged in extensive public works projects such as 
building roads and other infrastructure construction” (Mampilly 2011b: 2). On the other end 
of the spectrum, groups like the Peruvian ELN had a number of militants with medical train-
ing who on an ad hoc basis assessed and treated highland villagers that they encountered 
in remote mountain areas (Béjar 1982: 284). Importantly, although territorial control shapes 
and influences the types of services provided, it is not a pre-condition to their provision. In 
areas where insurgent movements only enjoy a clandestine presence they can use their 
coercive weight to intervene on behalf of their constituency in, for example, labour disputes 
as the M-19 did repeatedly in Colombia (Villamizar Herrera 1995). Alternatively, as the M-19 
also did, they can provide material benefits, albeit in an inconsistent fashion, such as the 
distribution of material necessities like milk or flour (Personal Interview M-19 militants, 
Bogota 2018). This supports the argument that armed groups do engage in forms of rebel 
governance prior to cementing territorial control. 
These services have been categorised in different fashions. Mampilly focuses on police 
and judicial mechanisms, health and education services, and feedback and representative 
mechanisms (2011b: 62). Wickham-Crowley arranged them into contributions to locals’ 
material security, defence and policing and representative forums such as local commit-
tees (1987: 483). This project puts forward an alternative analytical prioritisation of insur-
gent services for two reasons: firstly, as representative mechanisms are feasible only with a 
stronger degree of territorial control and this paper draws mostly on movements with lim-
ited or no territorial control, it would not make sense to include Mampilly and Wickham-
Crowley’s final criterion. Secondly, in light of the absolute heterogeneity of these services, a 
step up the ladder of conceptual abstraction focuses on four characteristics which facili-
tate insurgent service provision: the extent of previous state penetration, direct or indirect 
provision of services, the scale of insurgent social and/or territorial control, and the skills 
and specific expertise within insurgent movements. 
The extent of previous state penetration 
It has been argued that in areas where the state has previously been largely absent, it ren-
ders them more inclined to support rebel governance (Wickham-Crowley 2015: 50). While 
Mampilly states that it is “only through an understanding of the pre-conflict state-society 
relationship can we grasp the modalities that produce diverse insurgent governance efforts 
across cases, as various civilian populations, politically habituated in different ways, make 
distinct demands upon the rebel political authority” (2011b: 69). Accordingly, specific terri-
tories where locals are used to a relatively consistent standard of service provision, such as 
schools and health services will not be inclined to tolerate inferior forms of said services 
from insurgents, thus impelling insurgent movements to rapidly re-institute comparable 
forms of service provision. On the other hand, in territories largely devoid of state presence 
or characterised by a state presence filtered through rapacious local elites, locals would be 
likely better inclined to support even rudimentary forms of insurgent service provision. 
Direct or indirect provision of services 
The first point directly shapes the second: if there is a lingering state presence via institu-
tions such as schools or hospitals in areas under the influence of insurgents, it can often be 
an easier decision to facilitate their ongoing maintenance rather than usurping them and 
providing a likely inferior substitute. This coincides directly with Mampilly’s hypothesis that 
“if an insurgency emerges in a state with high penetration into society, it is more likely to be 
able to co-opt pre-existing institutions and networks into its civil administration, thereby 
improving governance provision”(2011b: 72). In fact, in many civil wars and even in areas of 
relatively robust insurgent territorial control, there is a lingering state presence via non-
military related, state institutions. Additionally, particularly in periods of lower intensity 
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fighting, a form of open, albeit uneasy coexistence between incumbent and insurgent forc-
es can exist, as in the protracted ceasefire in Nagaland on the Indian-Myanmar border 
(Thakur/Venugopal 2018; Kolås 2011). In many cases, incumbent governments continue to 
pay civil servants to provide services to areas under insurgent control. In the territory gov-
erned by the forces of the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria, the Assad regime con-
tinues to pay teachers and other civil servants’ salaries (Gurbuz 2018). This can often lead 
to the situation wherein rebel forces are in a position to be able to encourage continued 
government support for certain forms of administration (Arjona 2016b: 62). In Afghanistan, 
the Taliban obliges the government to continue to finance the school system while it de 
facto manages it, vetoing certain appointments and curricula, and monitoring teachers’ 
attendance records (Jackson 2018: 12–16). This uneasy co-existence between insurgent 
movements and government authorities (usually but not always excluding security forces) 
also draws into question Kalyvas’ (2006) renowned model to distinguish between insurgent 
and incumbent territorial control because, even when insurgents control a territory, there is 
often an enduring state institutional presence. While on the contrary, there is no (or at least 
only very rarely) an equivalent form of residual insurgent institutions in state territory, there-
fore, the Kalyvasian model of control does not compare like with like. 
On the contrary, when there is little or no state penetration, insurgent service provision is 
confronted with different challenges. It is advantageous in terms of insurgent legitimacy. If 
an insurgent movement is the first organised entity to provide basic medical services or to 
teach basic literacy skills, they can more easily obtain the support of grateful locals. This 
was the case in large “colonised” areas of Colombia settled by displaced peasants during la 
Violencia in the 1940s and 1950s. Armed groups like FARC and the M-19 in parts rural of 
areas like Caquetá, Huila and Putumayo were the only state-like authorities the residents 
there had ever experienced (Personal Interviews Bogota 2018). However, as Mampilly pro-
poses, “if an insurgency emerges in a state with minimal penetration into society, it is less 
likely to develop an effective governance system than one that emerges in a state that pen-
etrated deeply into society” (2011b: 72). In simple terms, all services will have to be provid-
ed directly by insurgent efforts themselves from scratch. This is naturally a much bigger 
logistical challenge; for example, it is easier to install an insurgent doctor in a medical cen-
tre abandoned by state doctors than to build one’s own insurgent hospital. This is particu-
larly true in the earlier phases of insurgent mobilisation when movements tend to be weak-
er and poorer in resources. Accordingly, insurgent services can be furnished directly or 
indirectly and this is largely shaped by prevailing extent of state penetration in a given area. 
The scale of insurgent social and/or territorial control 
As previously outlined, this project does not question the importance of territorial control in 
shaping the form of rebel governance provided. It is undeniable that, when an insurgent 
movement has full control of an area, the resulting stability allows for longer term planning 
by insurgent movements and the greater institutionalisation of forms of rebel governance. 
It is the difference between clandestine IRA volunteers passing secret judgement in impro-
vised and wholly non-transparent proceedings during the Troubles (1969–1998) 
(O’Docherty 1993), compared to the public courts cases with formalised appeals process 
and greater transparency by IRA militants during the Irish war of independence (1919–
1921) (Kotsonouris 1994). Even more pronounced differences prevail in the provision of 
health services, in territories controlled by the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) in 
Ethiopia they established a network of so-called baito medical clinics in territories it con-
trolled (Barnabas and Zwi 1997: 42–43). On the other hand, armed groups like the ELN in 
Peru (Béjar 1982: 284) could provide no more than basic assessment by doctors within the 
insurgent movement. Nevertheless, they are both forms of insurgent services provided to 
armed groups’ constituencies, simply ones that lie on different ends of the organisational 
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spectrum. Accordingly, one of the principal factors determining the type and scale of insur-
gent service provision is territorial control. As territorial control shifts during conflicts, one 
can also expect to see a related contraction or expansion of insurgent service provision. 
Specific expertise within insurgent movements 
A final dimension shaping insurgent service provision reflects the specific capacities of 
armed groups themselves. If a unit has a doctor they can provide, albeit sometimes only 
very basic, medical services. If there are insurgent engineers, they can perhaps offer exper-
tise regarding the building of a bridge or a drainage system. A common feature of many 
insurgent movements, particularly leftist ones, is that they have their origins in urban envi-
ronments (Wickham-Crowley 1993: 30). Many of these generally young recruits were re-
cruited from university milieus and therefore possess a relatively high level of social capital 
and intellectual resources. In the case of the multiplicity of would-be revolutionary move-
ments which became active in Kurdistan in the 1970s, many educated and bilingual youths 
used their higher social capital to translate official documents from Turkish for local Kurds, 
or helped them write petitions and generally mediate with the bureaucracy of the Turkish 
state (O’Connor 2014; Ercan 2010). Similar dynamics could be observed in the Colombian 
countryside when university educated youths offered analogous services to rural uneducat-
ed campesinos. However, the expertise of armed groups change endogenously to conflict 
through the acquisition of new skills, especially in relation to battlefield medicine (Haner 
2018: 192–94). Additionally, the demographic profile of insurgent movement evolves, early 
generations of recruits can often differ dramatically from subsequent ones (Bosi 2007; Bosi 
and della Porta 2012; Viterna 2006). This is a result of the high fatality rate of all guerrilla 
movements with skilled guerrillas (e.g. doctors) being replaced by unskilled ones or via an 
uptake in recruitment from local rural populations with lower educations levels (O’Connor 
and Oikonomakis 2015: 381). 
4.3 Insurgent Prison Mobilisation 
A universal feature of insurgent movements’ experiences is the reality that a significant 
proportion of its militants and sympathisers will be imprisoned. It is not uncommon for 
insurgent groups to have almost as many incarcerated members as active members. The 
imprisonment of movement leaders like Nelson Mandela and Abdullah Öcalan have be-
come central focuses of movements, and campaigns for their liberation are often a move-
ment priority. Indeed, through their writings many leaders have used their time in prison to 
refine their movements’ political ideologies (Öcalan 2012, 2011; Ocalan 2007). Yet, surpris-
ingly, given its inevitability, the fashion in which insurgent movements organise in prison 
has received little systematic theoretical analysis. In light of concerns about Salafi-jihadist 
recruitment in prison, there has been a number of important studies on prison as a potential 
site of radicalisation (Neumann 2010; Hecker 2018), but these are firmly embedded in a 
counter-terrorism approach and again do not focus on the movement appropriation of pris-
ons as a site of mobilisation. Laleh Khalili has produced a number of extremely interesting 
volumes focusing on state usages of the prison system (Khalili and Schwedler 2010; Khalili 
2012) and there are several fascinating case studies of prison resistance (O’Keefe 2006; 
Zeydanlıoğlu 2009; Serin 2013) but there is little systematic conceptual work on prison as a 
site of potential mobilisation from a movement perspective.  
Insurgent prison mobilization is also an interesting phenomenon to question, in a rounda-
bout fashion, the issue of spatial control. Prisons are the zenith of state control, prisoners 
are completely physically controlled “perfectly individualized and constantly visible” (Fou-
cault in O’Hearn 2009, 496) and even their bodily autonomy is undermined by practises of 
torture. Taking the understanding of territorial control to its most extreme understanding, 
there should be absolutely no resistance to authorities in prison. Indeed, in many cases this 
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does indeed occur, prison fundamentally weakens many movements, but it paradoxically 
also strengthens others. As O’Hearn argues cultures of resistance can actually thrive in 
prison as they “provide a mixture of confrontation and opportunities for self-organization 
rather than too much distance from repression” (2009: 496). In prison environments, minor 
mundane accomplishments such as the successful smuggling of contraband, the sharing 
of food, communication with supporters or the media, are elevated to the status of symbol-
ic victories consolidating a perception of collective agency and solidarity (O’Hearn 2009: 
507). Naturally this is not entirely dependent on the agency of the insurgent movements. If 
a state uses detention as a means to wholly exterminate a movement then no amount of 
prison resistance or organisation would likely result in survival. Yet, in many cases such as 
during the mass incarceration of Kurdish activists after the 1980 coup d’état in Turkey, 
movements react differently to similarly repressive circumstances, resulting in very differ-
ent political outcomes (Demirel 2009; Zana 1997; Zeydanlıoğlu 2009; Hakyemez 2017). In 
this case, the PKK emerged strengthened whereas other Kurdish movements, some even 
numerically larger than the PKK at the time, were comprehensively dismantled. Accordingly, 
although it is not the only determinant to insurgent outcomes in prison, the strategies 
adopted by movements can shape those outcomes and needs to be systematically ad-
dressed.  
Unlike the other routinised insurgent spaces, in prison much movement attention is focused 
on maintaining the cohesion and morale of existing militants, thereby a question of internal 
group discipline, as opposed to expanding insurgent support networks. Nevertheless, it 
does address issues related to its constituency in a number of ways. Firstly, in prison armed 
movements encounter other prisoners, some from rival or sympathetic movements, non-
militants detained on unsubstantiated political grounds – especially in instances of mass 
internment – and non-political prisoners. These non-members can become part of an 
armed movement’s constituency, within the confines of the prison and following their re-
lease. Another key feature of insurgent incarceration is that it can potentially create a bridge 
to their family members, thus bringing them into the movement’s orbit. This can be consol-
idated through the formation of prisoners’ supports committees and demonstrations ex-
pressing solidarity with prisoners. In order to comparatively analyse prisons as a specific 
form of RIS, it is necessary to focus on four dimensions. 
Insurgent Prison Organisation  
How do movements maintain cohesion in prison, do they organise education courses 
(Westrheim 2008), physical education or assign other tasks. Are prisoners allowed to adapt 
to the rhythms of prison life or obliged to maintain insurgent hierarchies? Of course, much 
of this depends on the types of prisons in which they are housed, dormitory style ones 
where prisoners are housed collectively or modern small cell styles, and the form of prison 
disciplinary regime. 
Insurgent Prison Resistance 
What, if any, forms of resistance do prisoners engage in? In the case of the PKK, famously 
four of its prisoners set themselves a light to protest their conditions and others committed 
suicide (Zeydanlıoğlu 2009: 11). Irish political prisoners in the IRA and INLA went on a hun-
ger strike resulting in ten deaths in 1981 (Ross 2012; O’Hearn 2009). In other instances, 
armed groups have organised violent resistance through riots within the prison or have had 
their comrades on the outside target prison wardens (Teitler 1974: 120; White 1993: 110). 
Others like the M-19 concentrated on organising prison break-outs (Personal Interviews 
Bogota 2018) 
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Building ties with other prisoners 
In prison, detainees have the chance to strengthen ties within the movement by meeting 
prisoners from different geographical or organisational parts of the movement. Additionally, 
the collective experience of surviving torture and more mundane forms of mobilisation 
generate dense emotional ties and solidarity. However, these emotionally laden ties are 
also shared with non-movement prisoners. Many detainees are presumed by the authorities 
to be members of a movement by virtue of their ethnic background, (e.g. as Kurds after the 
1980 military coup in Turkey), or due to their residence (e.g. in Nationalist housing estates 
in the north of Ireland). Others may be detained because of their involvement in other 
armed or political movements. These prisoners share the hardships of prison life with in-
surgent members and often result in them becoming sympathetic to the movement. The 
manner in which armed groups reach out to these other prisoners is a key component of 
forging routinised insurgent space in prison: how do they support survivors of torture and 
brutal interrogation, how do they help maintain the morale, do they help them by organising 
educational courses or by obtaining better recreational facilities? Efforts like this, in a con-
text of state brutality, create a broader constituency in prison which can then also be har-
nessed on the outside. In the wake of the 1980 putsch in Turkey, the PKK actively sought-
out recently released prisoners to recruit them (O’Connor 2014). This not surprisingly re-
sulted in a massive influx of recruits; as a former prisoner of that time, Selim Dindar, ob-
served “they [the Turkish state] made militants out of people in the Diyarbakır prison. Al-
most 80 percent of these people went to the mountains [took up arms]. It was very difficult 
for someone to pursue a normal life after having experienced such brutality” (in Zey-
danlıoğlu 2009: 81). Similar processes can be observed in the release of interned National-
ists and the IRA in the north of Ireland (Bew/Gillespie 1999: 37) and amongst student activ-
ists detained in Colombia in the late 1970s (Personal Interviews Bogota 2018). 
Building ties with family members and solidarity associations 
A final feature of insurgent organisation in prisons is that it also generates additional ties 
between prisoners and their family members, transversally between families of prisoners 
and in an organised way between the movement and these family members through pris-
oner support networks. At the individual level, the imprisonment of a brother or a parent can 
indirectly radicalise other family or friends. Previously non-politicised or politically unen-
gaged individuals can become so outraged by the detention and possible abuse of a loved 
one that they actively seek to become politically active themselves. Admittedly this can also 
work in a reverse fashion, whereby families blame the movement rather than the state for 
their imprisonment. Depending on the nature of the prison regime, prison visiting hours can 
be an unexpected space where families can re-connect with their imprisoned loved ones. 
Guerrillas are often absent from and not in contact with their families for years and their 
imprisonment can be a chance to re-create these connections. Secondly, through the rou-
tines of visiting prisoners, families of prisoners get to know one another creating another 
circle of ties around the movement. These can then be transformed into a political com-
mitment by participation in prisoner support networks. In many cases, these forms of asso-
ciations, albeit linked often quite openly to insurgent movements, enjoy widespread legiti-
macy and credibility. In the Basque country, prisoners support groups Gestoras Pro-
Amnestia and subsequently Senideak are extremely prominent in the broader Basque 
movement (Ward et al. 2010; Tellidis 2018). These associations are constantly replenished 
by released prisoners themselves and the families of newly imprisoned activists. In short, 
although the logic of prisons is to disrupt insurgent mobilisation, according to how move-
ments react, resist and organise in prison, they can, in fact, become hubs upon which insur-
gent constituencies can actually be strengthened.  
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4.4 Insurgent Funerals 
Along with incarceration, the other certainty of insurgency is death. The fatality rate for 
most insurgent groups is extraordinarily high; the estimated life expectancy of PKK guerril-
las is only three years (Gergin/Duru/Çetin 2015) and the movement is thought to have suf-
fered around 20,000 militant fatalities since 1984 (Tezcür 2016: 250). Paradoxically, even in 
death, militants can contribute to insurgent consolidation because their funerals can be 
transformed into highly emotive, collective rallying points between movements and their 
constituencies. Insurgent funerals have been long used as political platforms or demon-
strations of strength or expressions of resilience in many conflicts, as in the case of the IRA 
in Northern Ireland (Sluka 1995: 89), Hezbollah in Lebanon (Malthaner 2011: 216) and Ha-
mas in Palestine (Allen 2006). Indeed, they are also instrumentalised for similar ends by the 
state (Kibris 2011). Khalili described how various Palestinian factions’ transformation of 
funerals “into major political events was predicated on borrowing non-political ritual ele-
ments from quotidian [...] lives and transforming these elements into symbolically loaded 
political practices which resonated with a wide public” (Khalili 2007: 125). Thus insurgent 
funerals, aside from the personal suffering of grieving family members also became occa-
sions of political theatre. Mass funeral processions “act […] as both mobilizing and peda-
gogic tools” (Khalili 2007: 124) and serve to create and perform an expression of national 
unity (Allen 2006: 108). Mustafa Dikeç argues that the very act of physically bringing people 
together to occupy a particular space “gives political actors a sense of empowerment” 
(2016: 3). While Bayat explains that street politics, a category to which funeral corteges 
belong, are sites where people “forge identities, enlarge solidarities, and extend their protest 
beyond their immediate circles to include the unknown, the strangers” (2013: 13). The pres-
ence of constituency members in a shared collective space characterised by a great collec-
tive emotional intensity emboldens them, impressing upon them their potential power as a 
collectivity. This is even more prescient when it occurs in territories controlled by the state, 
especially urban centres. Funerals are temporarily and spatially delimited spaces of re-
sistance and occasions where the underlying political sympathies of the population, often 
dormant are brought forth into the public eye. 
Of course, not all dead militants’ funerals become acts of political theatre, in certain con-
texts the dead are simply returned to their families for burial, in others state intimidation 
convinces movements or families to bury the dead without political fanfare and in many 
other cases bodies are never recovered and remain unidentified on the battlefield or in 
mass graves. Indeed, they can also be loci of tension, when families blame the movements 
for leading their children to their deaths. Disputes can erupt as to whether the dead belong 
more to the families or their movements, as in the case of the thrice buried IRA hunger 
striker Frank Stagg (Ó Cadhla 2017) or Bakartxo Arzelus, the first ETA militant killed in 
combat in the post-Franco era (Casquete 2013: 30). And they can also be used as a plat-
form to communicate opposition to a movement, the act of not attending a funeral can be a 
subtle expression of discontent to movement leaders. The appropriation of funerals as 
routinised insurgent space crosses religious and ideological divides but not necessarily in a 
consistent fashion. In the case of the M-19 in Colombia, funerals were not politicised. The 
fallen guerrillas were simply returned to their families or buried in the countryside. The only 
significant funeral in the M-19s ranks, even though many of its prominent cadres and lead-
ers had been killed in the conflict, was that of its Presidential candidate Carlos Pizarro and 
occurred after the M-19 had disarmed (Personal interviews, Bogota 2018). Interestingly, 
other Colombia movements such as the ELN continue to make periodic use of politicised 
funerals (El Tiempo 2018). However, the non-usage of funerals as a political platform is in 
itself a political decision reflecting insurgent – constituency relations and, is itself, worthy 
of further analysis.  
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Insurgent funerals have two fundamental roles, performative and instrumental ones (Hearty 
2017: 7). As a performance they can reaffirm a movement’s enduring presence and 
strength both as a form of reassurance to an insurgent constituency and as a display of 
strength to its adversaries. However, this paper focuses on its more rational role in consoli-
dating and maintaining cohesion within its constituency. As previously outlined, the con-
stituency is a relational concept and exists only through its enactment and funerals are an 
ideal occasion to reaffirm and reproduce ties between insurgent movements and their con-
stituencies. They are also imbued with an inherent form of legitimacy because, although 
they are laden with political meaning, they also transcend politics by virtue of the inevitabil-
ity of death and its attendant suffering. Hearty argues that they are particularly useful as a 
means of drawing in peripheral support (2017: 11), which is borne out by the huge turnout 
at some insurgent funerals, particularly of high profile insurgents or activists. My previous 
research affirms this understanding: a very high percentage of my interviewees in Kurdi-
stan, particularly those raised in urban environments explained that their first knowing en-
counter with members of the PKK occurred at guerrilla funerals (O’Connor 2014). It is thus a 
space where initial ties can be struck with an insurgent movement.  
The funeral of Vedat Aydin in 1991, a prominent Kurdish human rights activist and HEP 
(Halkın Emek Partisi/People's Work Party) member in 1991, was a recurrent presence in 
many militants’ recollection of their initial interactions with the Kurdish movement. Aydin 
was murdered by elements of the Turkish security forces7 and his funeral was attended by 
150,000 mourners. The funeral procession was characterised by the chanting of revolution-
ary slogans and in its aftermath clashes broke out with the security forces resulting in a 
number of deaths (Gunes 2012: 111; Özcan 2006: 14; Gourlay 2018: 138). Thus individuals 
with weaker ties to an insurgent movement attend a funeral out of latent political solidarity, 
kin or family ties, or even simple curiosity and find themselves immersed in a highly emo-
tional space, where a sense of collective identity and collective empowerment (through 
chanting, funeral specific rituals, temporary appropriation of spaces normally controlled by 
the state) emerges and is then consolidated by clashes with the security forces leading to a 
sense of solidarity with the movement. As these clashes often result in deaths, the subse-
quent funerals provide an occasion for similar encounters to occur such that an escalatory 
cycle of funerals-clashes-funerals brings movements into closer contact with its constitu-
ency8.  
Insurgent funerals can accordingly be assessed according to their performative and more 
instrumental functions, albeit there is an overlap between performative and instrumental 
logics. In terms of performance, the funeral may be viewed as a show of strength oriented 
to external audiences such as rival movements or the state and/or an opportunity to high-
light the ongoing coherence and strength to the insurgents’ own constituency. Regarding 
funerals instrumental function, firstly, this can be assessed by the degree of movement 
organisation: Are funeral proceedings orchestrated by the movement, are specific move-
ment flags/symbols used, is there a formal ‘colour party’, is stewarding implemented, are 
graveside orations conducted? Secondly, what are the movement objectives: are they de-
liberately engineered as occasions to facilitate ties with the constituency? Are clashes with 
the security forces intentionally provoked to ‘blood’ potential new recruits? Or are funerals 
used as an opportunity to perpetuate the veneration of martyrs, thus garnering a degree of 
                                                 
 
7  Şükran Aydin and Others v. Turkey (Application no. 46231/99) ECHR 26 May 2005. Available at: 
http://echr.ketse.com/doc/46231.99-en-20050526/view/. 
8  A remarkable instance of such a cycle was that of three unarmed IRA militants (Sean Savage, Daniel 
McCann and Máiréad Farrell) killed by an SAS unit in Gibraltar in 1988. Their funeral was attacked by a loyal-
ist paramilitary, resulting in three deaths and 60 wounded. At the funeral of one of the dead, two undercover 
British soldiers drove into the mourners before being dragged from the car, stripped and severely beaten 
and ultimately shot by IRA members at the funeral (see Brennan 2018). 
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historical legitimacy binding the recently deceased with previous generations of deceased 
heroes. A final observation about insurgent funerals is that they can also demonstrate the 
normative parameters of an insurgent movement’s constituency. Do revolutionary and de-
cidedly areligious movements tolerate religious funerals or do they eschew prevailing tradi-
tions? The extent of continuity of prevailing rituals and beliefs could demonstrate a degree 
of greater and lesser tolerance to a constituency’s expectations, for example, the LTTE 
choose to bury their dead rather than cremating them as usually occurs in Hinduism 
(Mampilly 2011b: 115). 
5. CONCLUSION 
The relationship between insurgent movements and their supporters, long keenly observed 
by insurgent and counter insurgents, has in recent years been brought more systematically 
into the academic limelight. It has been addressed in rebel governance in terms of how 
armed movements govern territories under their control and in the relational end of social 
movement studies regarding the establishment of social ties and their varying functions in 
facilitating insurgent consolidation. This paper addresses the liminal areas where move-
ments are present without exerting territorial control but nevertheless manage to carve out 
temporally restricted and spatially constrained spaces of insurgent presence and influence. 
It is not simply a struggle to quantitatively control space but a process in which a particular 
social subjectivity is constituted with insurgent movement’s constituencies (Hussey 2018). 
To this end, armed groups formulate varying forms of routinised insurgent space: spaces 
which are often fleeting but substantial enough to generate opportunities to create ties, 
imbue them with emotional value and generate political legitimacy which, in the long term, 
can potentially contribute to territorial control. Yet, even more importantly than territorial 
control, these spaces are a wellspring of political legitimacy and the source of a reformu-
lated political imaginary which can be also applied to nonviolent post-conflict outcomes. In 
summary, it is an analysis of movement agency, focusing on the strategies movements 
choose to employ in building supportive constituencies, how they re-act to expressions of 
civilian agency and the spaces where they implement these strategies. 
This approach has, however, many evident limitations. Firstly, it makes no definitive claims 
to provide any overarching explanations of conflict outcomes. There are multiple other 
contingencies which can determine them, including “the ability of the insurgent leadership 
to maintain a unified and disciplined command structure; situational issues related to the 
actions of the incumbent government, civilian communities, and other social and political 
actors in rebel-held areas; and transnational issues produced by the interaction of rebel 
leaders with international actors” (Mampilly 2011b: 17). And, as the work of Jeremy Wein-
stein (2007) and others have shown, different movements have different forms of relation-
ships with civilians in their immediate social environments, generating different degrees of 
insurgent dependencies. Furthermore, movements’ ability to inculcate non-predatory and 
violent behaviours in their rank and file, is often beyond their capacity (Oppenheim and 
Weintraub 2017). This approach is also likely susceptible to the over-attribution of strategic 
intentions or movement agency (J. Jasper 2004) to developments that might be just hap-
penstance or coincidence.  
Accordingly, the implications of routinised insurgent space can be rather different across 
movements and across movement trajectories. The four forms of routinised insurgent 
space analysed here, are also not exhaustive, for example, funerals are almost completely 
irrelevant in the case of the M-19 but became of central importance to the PKK. Additional-
ly, there are forms of routinised insurgent space within these movements from the early 
1990s, which are less widely applicable, but nonetheless internally highly important such as 
the PKK’s focus on female emancipation inherent in its philosophy of jineoloji (Roelofs 
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2018) and attendant female spaces such as workshops and co-operatives for women (Ta-
tort Kurdistan 2013: 109). Finally, it emphasises the non-coercive forms of armed group – 
civilian interactions. It may seem somewhat counter-intuitive to focus on the non-violent 
elements of movements defined by their capacity to inflict violence. Yet, for most armed 
groups actual fighting and preparing to fight, is only but a part of their repertoire of conten-
tion and many militants engaged in years of activism in armed groups and never experience 
combat. Nevertheless, there is a risk of downplaying practises of coercion and even the 
implicit knowledge of their potential use, when analysing the emergence, consolidation and 
evolution of routinised insurgent spaces. As an initial step to formulating a conceptual 
framework to spatially situate insurgent – constituency relations, it requires further as-
sessment and re-conceptualisation by being applied to different cases and in particular to 
cases where armed group – constituency interactions were characterised more acutely by 
violence or degenerated into open coercion. 
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 Appendix – Armed Movements  
 
Acronym Name in Original Language (transliteration) Name in English 
ASALA Ayasdani Azadakrut'ean Hay Kaghdni Panag Armenian Secret Army for the 
Liberation of Armenia  
EAM  Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo National Liberation Front 
ELN9 Ejército de Liberación Nacional National Liberation Army 
ETA Euskadi Ta Askatasuna  Basque Homeland and Liberty 
EZLN Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional Zapatista Army of National Libera-
tion 
FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia  
Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia—People's Army 
FLN Fuerzas de Liberación Nacional National Liberation Forces 
HEP Halkın Emek Partisi People’s Labour Party 
LTTE Tamiḻīḻa viṭutalaip pulika Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
INLA Arm Saoirse Náisiúnta na hÉireann Irish National Liberation Army  
IRA Óglaigh na hÉireann Irish Republican Army 
ISIS ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah fī 'l-ʿIrāq wa-sh-Shām Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
M-19 Movimiento 19 de Abril The 19th of April Movement 
PKK Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê Kurdish Workers Party 
TPLF Həzbayawi Wäyyanä Harənnät Təgray Tigray People's Liberation Front 
                                                 
 
9  There were two armed groups named the ELN, one active in Peru for a few years in the mid-1960s and 
another founded in Colombia in 1964 which is still active. There was no relationship between the two 
groups. 
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